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Sherally Munshi has written a thoughtful and moving article about the relationship among race, citizenship,
immigration, and the visual imagery of assimilation and difference. In “You Will See My Family Became So American,”
she tells the story of Dinshah Ghadiali, a Parsi Zoroastrian born and raised in India who immigrated to the United
States in 1911, became a U.S. citizen in 1917, and prevailed over the federal government’s effort to strip him of that
citizenship in 1932. Along with Ghadiali himself—proud American, soldier, erstwhile inventor, political activist, and all in
all memorable character with a larger-than-life personality—the protagonists in the story are a striking series of
photographs Ghadiali submitted into evidence in his denaturalization trial. Munshi’s bold and ranging exploration of a
variety of themes in the legal history of race, citizenship, and immigration culminates in a close reading of these
photographs, in which she shows how the images reveal the tension between the “effortful displays of
Americanization… and unwitting disclosures of racial identity.” (P. 693.)
Munshi frames her discussion with a central doctrinal precedent and a proposed theoretical framework. The precedent
is the Supreme Court’s decision in Thind v. United States, which in 1923 held that Bhaghat Singh Thind, “a high caste
Hindu, of full Indian blood, born [in] India” was not “a white person” under the naturalization laws. Along with the
previous year’s Ozawa v. United States (1922), which had held the same with respect to a Japanese man, Takao
Ozawa (though with different reasoning—more on that below), the decision in Thind gave rise to efforts to denaturalize
some who had become citizens before the decisions but were deemed ineligible afterwards, and formed the basis for
Ghadiali’s (unsuccessful) denaturalization trial.
The theoretical framework is the “minor comparativism” of the article’s subtitle. Munshi briefly outlines what she takes
to be the salient strengths and weaknesses of comparative law scholarship, and brings these insights to bear in
proposing a version of a comparative approach to the study of history within, rather than across, national boundaries.
The strength she has in mind is the “self-reflexive” orientation of comparative law scholarship, which “inclines the
scholar outward, beyond her immediate world and towards the worlds of others with the anticipation that, through her
study of another society, she might begin to question her own.” (P. 664.) The weaknesses are comparative law’s
tendency, in spite of itself, to entrench statism; its focus on formal law; and its failure to treat the migrant as central,
rather than peripheral, to the formation of the modern state. Munshi’s minor comparativism, in contrast, “adopt[s] the
perspective of those who remain foreign within one’s own country,” and in this way brings a comparativist sensibility to
the study of domestic history, which in turn “decenters the state,” replaces formalism with attention to “the unreported,
unwritten, and often inchoate character of the law and its effects,” and places the migrant at the center of narratives of
state formation. (Pp. 664-66.) While these are not novel approaches to the study of legal history, the idea that one
should pursue “comparativism” within rather than across national boundaries is intriguing and refreshing, and
contributes to a heightened awareness of what constitutes the “American” in “American legal history.”
At the center of the story are the images submitted by Ghadiali at his denaturalization trial and analyzed in detail by
Munshi. Were we to base our historical understanding principally on sources like the Court’s decisions in Ozawa and
Thind, we might conclude that what Ghadiali tried to do, and did successfully, was convince the judge in his trial that he
was “white.” But what are the chances? More apt and illuminating is what Munshi suggests: “Perhaps having failed to
convince the judge of his essential whiteness, Ghadiali sought to persuade him that, even if he did not look white, he
did look American.” (P. 660.)
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The series begins with a photograph of Ghadiali on a police report, of all things: he submitted it because in the relevant
section, the report labeled him “White.” The next one shows his family: himself, his (also Indian) wife, and his two
children, all wearing coats and hats (the wife, a scarf). The third shows him and his two children—no wife (she’d
returned to India). The fourth shows him as a commander in the New York Police Reserve Air Service, alongside a few
dozen men also in uniform (though not all commanders). The fifth shows his five children from his second marriage, all
wearing the same outfits and little white hats and sitting on bicycles—no wife (though this time, he had one—a second
wife—now German, and white, and a citizen herself), and no Ghadiali either.
I’m not going to summarize what Munshi says about all of these, but I will quote Ghadiali’s plea to the judge: “He
explained that he was deserted by his first wife ‘because I would become a Citizen. Now America throws me out and
my second wife will desert me because I did not become a Citizen. The government puts me in a funny position.’” (P.
714.) Ghadiali did prevail and remain a citizen. Those photographs surely helped, though the judge ended up deciding
the case on res judicata grounds, treating Ghadiali’s 1917 admission into citizenship as having settled the matter.
Ghadiali’s story serves as both anchor and springboard for the larger legal history of race, citizenship, and immigration
Munshi offers in this piece. With each episode, she engages provocatively with relevant secondary literatures.
Discussing Ozawa and Thind, she invokes Ian Haney Lopez on the legal construction of racial categories, and goes on
to offer her own take, explaining what she finds most remarkable about the shift in the Court’s reasoning. In Ozawa, the
Court seemed to rely principally on what was then the state-of-the-art science of race to conclude that a Japanese
person was not “Caucasian” within the meaning of the naturalization statutes. But in Thind, it had to answer the
argument that, as an Indian, Thind belonged squarely in the category of “Caucasians.” The Court couldn’t disagree,
so it shifted emphasis and focused on common (read: white people’s) understandings of race instead of scientific
ones, relying on those to reject Thind’s claim to citizenship as well. Munshi does not disagree—how could one?—that
the two cases together are an especially blatant example of the law’s construction of race, but she turns our attention
to what she finds even more intriguing about the Court’s reasoning in Thind: Justice Sutherland’s reliance on what he
perceived as “instincts” about race. Munshi quotes Sutherland, explaining that “‘Hindus’ ‘racial difference’ was ‘of
such character and extent that the great body of our people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of
assimilation.’” (P. 674.) This is not as much about common knowledge, Munshi observes, as it is about
common “sense”—about something “visceral.” (Pp. 674-75.) “Here, the power to designate racial qualification for
citizenship is withdrawn not only from the language of race experts but from language altogether.” (P. 674, emphasis
added.) By force of the Court’s ruling in Thind, she adds—pushing herself and her reader just a little harder (as she
does throughout)—the phrase “free white persons” itself “gains a flesh and corporeality” by virtue of the Court’s
investing in “white persons” the power to interpret the phrase “white persons.” (P. 675.)
Munshi turns back to look at Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and the “colorblind” Constitution, a discussion that yields
among its insights the observation that “[c]olorblindness imposes a visual management of difference on the part of the
observed, who is burdened with proving, over and over, that her difference does not disqualify her from equal
membership.” (P. 679.) A discussion of Elk v. Wilkins (1884), which rejected the claim to citizenship of a Native
American who had left his tribe and tried to register to vote, takes issue with the received understanding that the United
States has always conferred jus soli citizenship, concluding from this and other histories of exclusion that “[i]n the
United States, for much of the nineteenth century, a right of blood masqueraded as a right of soil.” (P. 687.) Also in this
discussion, she proposes that for Native Americans, Congress devised a “contractual model of citizenship,”
conditioned on “the destruction of tribal identity” (Id.)—a model that, revised, comes to play a role in Ghadiali’s trial.
Elsewhere, she discusses a photograph of Thind in an army uniform. This photograph, she notes, is often printed
without explicit analysis, “as if the image speaks for itself.” (P. 679.) Munshi then offers her own analysis, discussing
“the apparent tension between racial or ethnic particularity, on the one hand, and the project of national unity, on the
other.” (P. 680.) In other words, what “we” all know when we look at it is that Thind’s turban and beard signal his
“difference” while his uniform signals his assimilation, and what Munshi argues is that this tension is crucial to what we
imagine as an inclusive multiculturalism: “Thind can only project racial inclusiveness by first appearing to us as raced.”
(P. 681.)
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Along with all of the above—a compelling story, a memorable historical figure, rich primary sources, a fascinating series
of legal developments, a useful theoretical framing—Munshi writes with sensitivity and empathy, such as when she
observes that an account published by Ghadiali recounting his own denaturalization trial “expresses an anguish and
alienation that was widely experienced by minorities in the United States but barely understood by the larger national
community.” (P. 669.) The nature of law, the instability of boundaries, the relationship among persons, place, and the
state—all of this, yes, and also, the things that make us want to cry: Munshi wants us to think hard about it all.
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